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Introduction 
In the past decades scholars have repeatedly found strong support for democratic norms1 
accompanied by difficulties to apply these norms to practical situations. In other words, while 
people generally believed democracy to be a good thing and supported basic freedoms, the 
willingness to extend these freedoms to disliked groups, i.e. Political Tolerance, appeared to 
be rather low (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 244). Indeed, as recent developments, such as 
the forming of human chains in Germany to prevent right-wing activists from marching 
peacefully2, the adoption of a burqa ban in France3 and the discussions in the Netherlands 
about the pedophiles’ right to exist as a legal group have shown, Political Tolerance is a good 
not easily attained (Openbaar Ministerie 2011). Yet, as e.g. Roberts et al. (1985) have pointed 
out, democratic institutions can only be preserved if accompanied by a commitment to 
politically tolerant norms, i.e. if civil liberties are also extended to disliked groups (Roberts et 
al. 1985, 83)4. Several authors have shown that Political Tolerance is not only influenced by 
support for democratic norms, personality traits, education and threat perception but seems to 
be independently influenced by certain contexts (Sullivan et al. 1993, Peffley and 
Rohrschneider 2003; Dutch and Gibson 1992).  
 
Sullivan et al. (1993) suggest that political tolerance can be learned in the political arena, a 
context where one is steadily and strongly exposed to democratic norms and needs to 
regularly apply these norms in practice (Sullivan et al. 1993, 70, 71). Furthermore, Dutch and 
Gibson (1992) have found higher levels of tolerance towards fascist groups in countries where 
radical groups enjoy some popular support, thus where people are exposed to a variety of 
political ideas (Dutch and Gibson 1992, 262, 267). Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) found a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!E.g. Freedom of Speech!
2
 Hamburger Abendblatt, “17.000 Menschen bilden Kette gegen Neonazis,” Hamburger Abendblatt, 13 February 2011. 
http://www.abendblatt.de/politik/article1785927/17-000-Menschen-bilden-Kette-gegen-Neonazis.html (Accessed 23 April 2012). 
3 BBC News Europe, ”French Senate Votes to Ban Islamic Full Veil in Public,” BBC News Europe, 14 September 2010. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11305033 (Accessed 23 April 2012). 
4 Gibson (2006) however maintains that allowing all liberties to all groups might not be good for democracy either (Gibson 2006, 23). 
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positive link between federalism and the willingness to extend the rights to demonstrate and 
hold public office to disliked groups. They suggest that federalist structures offer more 
opportunities to absorb democratic norms due to the need to accommodate a greater variety of 
interests and because of the options to resolve conflict at a much lower level, “involving 
citizens directly” in the democratic process (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 245, 246). 
As aforementioned these authors suggest that Political Tolerance can be learned in the 
political arena, when exposed to a wide range of interests and in a context where conflicts can 
be solved more directly. These attributes are to some extent also reflected in systems that have 
Direct Democracy provisions. Through these mechanisms issues previously neglected by the 
legislature can become a point of discussion and conflicts can be solved (Alber 2012, 80). In 
addition, while certainly watered down, the direct participation in decision-making somehow 
reflects the political arena. Finally, as opposed to purely representative systems, in systems 
having a more Direct Democracy citizens are most certainly exposed to a greater variety of 
interests. As Dahl (1971) argues "the greater the opportunities for expressing, organizing, and 
representing political preferences, the greater the number and variety of preferences and 
interests that are likely to be represented in policy making" (Dahl 1971, 26). These multiple 
interests might challenge previously held ideas and demand compromise among the wider 
population.  
 
However, while research has been conducted on the effects of Direct Democracy, the 
relationship between Direct Democracy and Political Tolerance has hardly been addressed. 
Gamble (1997), conducting a study on Direct Democracy and minority rights in the United 
States, found that measures restricting minority rights were more likely to be adopted than 
other measures when brought to a popular vote. Unfortunately these findings might only 
reflect the extension of intolerant attitudes to the actual vote and do not measure Political 
Tolerance directly. Mendelson and Cutler (2000) examined Political Intolerance in a 1992 
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Canadian referendum and found a decrease of Political Intolerance over the course of the 
referendum process. However, the authors did not employ the same measurement for Political 
Tolerance as will be used in this study, which makes a comparison of the findings difficult. In 
addition, both studies lack a country comparison. Since it has been found that sources of 
tolerance vary significantly between countries, in order to draw more general conclusions 
about system-level attributes a country comparison is essential (Dutch and Gibson 1992, 238, 
260). This study wants to address this gap in the literature by asking the following question: 
How does the directness of democracy influence Political Tolerance? 
 
 
Conceptualization and Literature 
Political Tolerance  
Although different definitions exist, Political Tolerance is widely accepted as “the 
willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests that one opposes” (Sullivan et 
al. 1979, 784). In other words, if, for example, one has no aversion to right-wing ideas one 
will have no difficulties to extend civil liberties (e.g. speech, holding office) to groups 
representing such ideas. Under circumstances however where one does not approve of these 
ideas, one’s abstract support for democratic norms is challenged and one is assumed to be 
politically tolerant if one is still willing to extend the civil liberties supported at an abstract 
level to these groups (Sullivan et al. 1979, 784).  
 
Stouffer (1955) who had conducted one of the earliest Political Tolerance studies measured 
the willingness to allow communists, socialists and atheists (among others) to speak publicly, 
to teach and to have a book written by them available at a public library. He found that a 
majority of the respondents would not allow communists these rights and, although to a lesser 
extent, would also not extend these rights to atheists, socialists and suspected communists. He 
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suggested that with education, more liberal child-rearing practices increasing the likelihood of 
freedom of thought, more personal movement and developments in the media, these attitudes 
would become more positive over time (Stouffer 1955 in Sullivan et al. 1979; Stouffer 1955, 
236). Indeed, when tested a few years later (1975; 1978) measuring Political Tolerance with 
the same groups and items, scholars discovered that the likelihood to allow these rights to the 
respective groups appeared to have increased offering some credit to Stouffer’s original 
predictions (Davis 1975; Nunn et al. 1978).  
 
Nevertheless, while acknowledging these previous findings, Sullivan et al. (1979) were 
critical of those approaches to the subject at hand and the validity of these findings. Their 
main point of criticism was that these studies had focused on left-wing targets only, targets of 
dislike that were time-bound (during the Cold War) and depended on one’s political position 
(left-right on political scale). The responses might have been contaminated by these 
exogenous influences and what was measured might have been the salience of a group or 
whether it was liked or disliked (Sullivan et al. 1979, 792). In order to address the assumed 
previous shortcomings they employed a content-controlled measurement that enabled 
respondents to first choose their least-liked group as well as their second least-liked group5 
before being asked to answer whether they were willing to extend a set of civil liberties to 
these groups. Indeed, when employing this new measurement Sullivan et al. (1979) were able 
to cast serious doubts about the previously held assumptions. Their findings suggested that the 
aggregate willingness to extend civil liberties to disliked groups had not increased. Instead, 
attitudes of intolerance had moved to new and a greater variety of target groups (Sullivan et 
al. 1979, 792). The definition of the concept will therefore be in line with these findings “as 
the willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests” that one finds most 
objectionable (Sullivan et al. 1979, 784). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Respondents could either choose from a list of potentially disliked groups or choose a group not on the list (Sullivan et al 1979, 785). 
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Direct Democracy 
Direct Democracy is seen as a “publicly recognized institution wherein citizens decide or 
emit their opinions on issues- other than through legislative and executive elections- directly 
at the ballot box through universal and secret suffrage” (Altman 2011, 7). As of today, on a 
state level, no pure direct democracies exist anymore. In many countries however, direct 
democracy mechanisms (DDM) complement representative elements. DDMs can take the 
forms of plebiscites, referendums, citizens’ initiatives, counter-proposals and recalls (Altman 
2011, 7). In this study recalls will not be considered as (nationally) they are not that common 
and are also not one of the mechanisms used in the countries6 being the focus of this study 
(Altman 2011, 16).  
 
Among countries as well as among scholars there is little consensus about what constitutes a 
plebiscite and what constitutes a referendum. According to Altman (2011) plebiscites are 
popular votes on a constitutional reform, law or other measures that change the present stage 
of political affairs. They come from above either mandated by the constitution or initiated by 
the president or the legislature. A further distinction is made between a consultative 
plebiscite, a non-binding popular vote to determine public opinion on a simple question of 
national importance7 and a facultative plebiscite, a binding popular vote to ratify a proposed 
decision (decree or law) made by the authorities (“executive, legislative or both”) (Altman 
2011, 13). Conversely referendums by Altman’s (2011) definition are instruments that come 
from below, i.e. a popular vote triggered by a number of citizens to adopt or reject an adopted 
law8 (Altman 2011, 15). However, this distinction does not easily fit with the country specific !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'!Australia, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, New Zealand!
7 For example, both Sweden and Finland held a popular vote on the accession to the European Union. Australia consulted the public on the 
adoption of national anthem and New Zealand on the publicly preferred electoral system (R2D 2012a, b, c, e). 
8 For example, Switzerland has held votes on issues including the participation in the Bretton Woods institutions, health insurance and old 
age insurance (R2D 2012d). 
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information offered by the Research Center on Direct Democracy. According to this source 
plebiscites appear to be what Altman (2011) refers to as consultative plebiscites or facultative 
plebiscites and referendums appear to be either mandatory plebiscites or facultative 
referendums (R2D 2012; R2D 2012a, b, c, d, e). Hence, in this research project a plebiscite 
will be defined as a consultative non-binding vote on a question of national importance or a 
facultative binding vote on a decree or law proposed by the authorities. The term referendum 
will be divided into mandatory referendum, i.e. an obligatory popular vote usually on a 
constitutional amendment and facultative referendum, i.e. a popular vote triggered by a 
certain percentage of the citizenry to approve or veto an existing law.  
 
Like facultative referendums, Citizens’ initiatives are bottom-up devices. However, in 
contrast to facultative referendums a certain percentage of the citizenry can propose new 
legislation or a revision of the constitution (Altman 2011, 15). Counterproposals as the final 
DDM considered in this study are devices that are used by government or the legislature as a 
reaction to the activation of another DDM (usually citizens’ initiative) and are simultaneously 
voted on with the other proposed measure. Both initiative and counterproposal outcomes are 
legally binding (Altman 2011, 14).  
 
Political Tolerance, Direct Democracy and Socialization to System Norms 
After having elaborated on the concepts central in this study I will now turn to considering the 
literature on the question at hand. Up till now little has been written on Direct Democracy in 
relation to Political Tolerance. In a study conducted in the United States, Gamble (1997) 
found that the support at the ballots for initiatives that restrict the civil rights of minorities was 
much greater than for any other initiatives or referendums held in the respective states 
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(Gamble 1997)9. However, these findings might only reflect the translation of already 
intolerant attitudes into practice. The study lacks the comparison with other states in which 
DDMs are not used. 
 
Mendelson and Cutler (2000) examined Political Intolerance in a 1992 Canadian referendum 
and found that over the course of the referendum process Political Intolerance actually 
decreased. While the findings are certainly interesting, the authors employed a different 
conceptualization10 as well as a different measurement of Political Tolerance than will be 
used in the upcoming study. More specifically their targets of dislike were preselected (either 
English-Canadians or French-Canadians and immigrants so not content-controlled) and for 
the measurement of tolerance they used a “feeling thermometer” as well as three additional 
variables: support for minority rights, prejudice towards immigrants and “provincentrism” 
(Mendelson and Cutler 2000, 696).  
 
The measurement with a feeling thermometer is problematic in that it only measures the 
warmth towards the respective groups and not whether respondents would be willing to allow 
civil liberties to these potentially disliked groups. The additional variables were not 
measuring Political Tolerance as it is understood in this paper, they were measuring abstract 
support of minority rights, prejudice11 and through “provincentrism12, how one rates the other 
province (Gibson 2006, 25, 26; Mendelson and Cutler 2000, 696). All these variables do not 
touch upon the concept of Political Tolerance handled in this research project. Also, both of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 A study in Switzerland on the restriction of religious minorities’ rights through initiatives and referendums could not find such an effect 
(Christmann A., and D. Danaci. 2012). 
10 The authors appeared to have conceptualized Political Intolerance in terms of “tribal loyalties” and “the willingness to restrict minority 
rights” (Mendelson and Cutler 2000, 696). ""!Prejudice as part of the Social Tolerance measurement appeared to only be weakly related to Political Tolerance (Gibson 2006, 25, 26).!"#!This articicial variable only makes sense in!the context of the Political Tolerance study in bilingual Canada taking into account 
provincial differences.!
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the studies, the one by Gamble (1997) and the one by Mendelson and Cutler (2000), focused 
on one country only, so general conclusions could not be drawn.  
 
Due to the lack of evidence it is therefore useful not to focus too much on Direct Democracy 
per se but to examine the literature on its individual aspects. DDMs enable citizens to 
participate directly in the decision-making process thus involving them in politics. Several 
authors have investigated the linkage between exposure to the struggles of democratic politics 
and Political Tolerance. While Sullivan et al. (1981) conducting a study in the United States 
did not find evidence for a relationship between political participation and Political Tolerance 
Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) who conducted a cross-country comparison of 17 countries 
found higher levels of tolerance among people that engaged in democratic activism, i.e. 
signing a petition, joining boycotts and demonstrating which suggests a learning effect due to 
the stronger exposure to politics (Sullivan et al. 1981, 99; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 
251). Sullivan et al.’s findings (1993) support the broader understanding of this notion. The 
greater Political Tolerance found among legislators, given the least-liked group did not pose a 
threat to democracy or democratic stability, is explained through the legislators’ experience of 
acting in the political arena which offers a steady “prime” with democratic norms, confronts 
them with different ideologies and asks for compromise (Sullivan et al. 1993, 53, 72). A 
system in which people have to cast their vote on a greater variety of issues and in which 
people have to vote more frequently might, to some extent, be comparable to a political arena. 
Through a greater diversity of issues to vote on, people are more likely to be confronted with 
interests remote from their own set of ideas, principles or ethical values, which forces them to 
tackle such “unfamiliar” interests. When doing so, they must reconsider their own attitudes 
towards these new, different, uncomfortable and “strange” subjects of discussion. This 
constant introspection and conscious task of revisiting one’s own position is believed to be a 
necessary step in learning to become politically more tolerant.  
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However, Direct Democracy is also a system-level variable, an institution that can, especially 
if frequently used over a long period of time and on a diversity of issues, affect the tolerant 
attitudes of citizens. Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) found that individuals were more 
likely to extend the right to hold public office and to demonstrate to their least-liked groups in 
older stable democracies and countries with a federalist state structure. They argue that a long 
and consistent exposure to the “ruff-and tumble of democratic politics”, provided by older 
democracies, as well as opportunities to absorb these norms, accommodate different interests 
and the existence of “multiple points of access to resolve conflict”, provided by federalist 
state structures, can be conducive to the adoption of more tolerant attitudes (Peffley and 
Rohrschneider 2003, 245, 246, 254).  
 
DDMs in older stable democracies have similar implications in that they can encourage 
citizens to absorb democratic norms. Barber (1989) argues that initiatives and referendums 
can help citizens understand their rights and duties as citizens. In addition, growing 
experience with this form of participation leads people to become more careful in forming 
their opinion (Barber 1989, 282, 284). DDMs also have the potential to accommodate 
conflicting interests. Referendums have been used to break political deadlocks while in some 
countries popular initiatives can bring interests that have been previously overlooked by the 
legislature on the political agenda and into the public sphere. Especially if these issues are 
controversial it can lead to lively debates within the population, between political elites as 
well as between these elites and the various interest groups. This creates the need to find 
consensus (Alber 2012, 80; Papadopoulos 2001, 44).  
 
Issues raised through DDMs, especially where they are successful at the poles and legally 
binding, can lead to greater interest diversity at system-level and even where issues do not get 
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the anticipated popular support or these instruments are not binding they might still indirectly 
influence the decisions by legislators and so lead to more issue diversity (Papadopoulos 2001, 
44, 45) 13. While controlling for the effects of threat perception, Dutch and Gibson (1992) 
examining Political Tolerance towards “fascists” in 12 Western European countries found a 
greater willingness to allow the group to exist as a legal group, to hold public rallies and to 
run for public office in systems where radical parties enjoy some popular support. They argue 
that a greater system-level ideological diversity can legitimize the existence of other political 
interests and can therefore lead a greater likelihood that tolerant attitudes are adopted (Dutch 
and Gibson 1992, 242, 263). While one should be careful with readily accepting these finding 
(the study only focused on “fascists”) they nonetheless offer some limited support that 
Political Tolerance can be learned in countries where multiple political ideas enjoy system-
level representation. 
 
As pointed out above, DDMs can lead to a more pluralistic political environment, especially 
where they are used frequently, on a diverse set of issues and where they are legally binding. 
Systems not only including plebiscites but also further DDMs such as referendums and 
initiatives, offer more “points of access” to accommodate different interests. Thereby an 
environment conducive to the learning of democratic norms is created and consequently the 
likelihood of extending civil liberties to disliked groups might increase. This leads to the 
following expectation: 
 
H1 Independent of other system level variables Political Tolerance should be more likely in 
more direct democracies. 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Boehmke (2002) conducting a study in the United States has found a greater number and diversity of interest groups in states that have 
citizens’ initiatives, thus Direct Democracy is likely to also have an indirect effect on interest diversity (Boehmke 2002). 
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 Methods and Operationalization 
While individual level variables have shown to be associated with Political Tolerance, due to 
the limited time frame, this research project focuses on the impact of system-level variables 
only. Five countries, Australia, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland and New Zealand will be 
considered14. They were chosen on the basis of having enjoyed at least fifty years of 
continuous and stable democratic rule and scored the same on the polity III data15 set in all 
aspects but federalism. They also vary in their Direct Democracy provisions.  
 
For the key variables Political Tolerance and Direct Democracy data from the World Value 
Survey (WVS) 1995-1998 and data collected from the Centre for Research on Direct 
Democracy is used (C2D). The WVS 1995-1998, the second wave of a five wave worldwide 
investigation (1981-2007) into “socio-cultural and political change” was conducted in 57 
states encompassing all continents (Inglehart and Baker 2000, 23; World Value Survey 2012a, 
c). Of the original number of respondents16 a number of respondents had to be dropped 
because they were either not asked the questions or did not answer them. The final number of 
respondents was 1949 for Australia, for Sweden 872, for Finland 865, for Switzerland 1046 
and for New Zealand 936. The WVS data is well suited for the purpose of this study because 
its Political Tolerance questions, entailing the content controlled “least-liked group” 
measurement by Sullivan et al. (1979), were also asked in a number of stable Western 
democracies that vary in their directness of democracy at national level.  
 
The R2D is a research center that collects data and conducts research on direct democratic 
institutions worldwide including their “history, legal origins and political implications” (R2D 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 West Germany and the United States of America were not taken along because they only have Direct Democracy institutions on a region 
level. Other countries (e.g. Italy, United Kingdom) had to be dropped because of missing data on the key dependent variable. 
15 The Polity III dataset offers the yearly Democracy-Autocracy score of 161 independent countries with a population size of more than 
500'000 (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, 470).  
16 Australia had 2048 respondents, Sweden 1009, Finland 987, Switzerland 1212 and New Zealand 1201 respondents. 
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2012f). Compared to other sources (e.g. Beramendi et al. 2008) the R2D database offers 
detailed information on Direct Democracy Mechanisms, the number of votes conducted since 
their institutionalization, the issues voted on and their legal bindingness, which makes it 
suitable for the purpose of this study. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Political Tolerance was operationalized by first asking respondents to choose their least-liked 
group17 (see table 1) and then letting them answer whether they would let their least-liked 
group hold public office, teach18 in one’s schools and hold public demonstrations (see 
appendix 1). Answers were dichotomous (Yes/No). For the purpose of this study these 
answers were recoded in 0= no and 1= yes and then combined in a Political Tolerance index 
with values ranging from 0= allows none to 3= allows all. One of the problems already 
encountered by Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) with the WVS data is that criminals, who 
by law often do not enjoy the same civil liberties as other groups19 were also included as a 
least-liked group (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 247). However, this can also apply to 
other groups in society as illustrated by Finland’s repeated outlawing of right-wing 
organizations after World War II (Alvarez-Rivera 2011). In addition removing these 
respondents would have lead to a greater disproportion in respondents between countries, 
making the countries less comparable. Since in none of the countries, criminals as a least-
liked group exceeded 40% these respondents were therefore taken into account. 
 
Table 1 shows the percentages of the “least-liked group” responses per country. One aspect 
clearly visible, is that target groups of dislike not only differ among respondents (as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"(!Least-liked groups were adapted to country-level differences. 
18 The right to demonstrate and the right to hold public office have been identified as basic civil liberties (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 
248). To teach at one’s school was explicitly included as a variable. The ones that teach at one’s school raise the future generation of political 
participants. If certain groups are denied this right, the future civil liberties of that group might become seriously restricted. "*!The respondents might misunderstand the question. They might not give “Political Tolerance” answers (Peffley and Rohrschneider 
2003, 247). 
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discovered by Sullivan et al. 1979) but also per country. While there is generally a greater 
tendency towards adopting right-wing extremists as a least-liked group New Zealand’s radical 
Maori for example appear to be the most frequently selected target of dislike among 
respondents from New Zealand.   
 
Table 1 Least-Liked Group by Country 
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Australia .0% 2.5% 10.8% 1.5% 4.4% 16.1% 60.0% 4.7% .0% .0% .0% .0% 
Sweden .0% .0% 4.5% .6% 1.9% 7.6% 21.1% .0% .0% 5.3% 18.6% 40.5% 
Finland .6% 1.6% 3.8% 2.9% 3.4% 36.9% 50.9% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 
Switzerland 1.1% 5.1% 4.2% 1.8% 1.4% 18.8% 67.6% .0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 
New Zealand .0% 3.3% 3.8% .5% 2.5% 33.5% 8.1% .0% 48.2% .0% .0% .0% 
Total .3% 2.6% 6.4% 1.5% 3.0% 21.3% 45.5% 8.0% 1.6% .8% 2.9% 6.2% 
 
Main Independent Variable 
The key independent variable is national-level Direct Democracy, taking into account all data 
collected from 1945 up to 199520. It was measured by creating an index21 including the 
number of Direct Democracy Mechanisms (1=No to 5= 4)22, the frequency of use of the 
DDMs (scale from 1=low to 5=high), issue diversity (scale from 1=No to 5=High) and 
whether the DDMs are legally binding (1=Never to 5=Always). Even though other studies 
have used other indices23 to measure Direct Democracy, this newly created index most 
closely measures the aspects of Direct Democracy that are of interest to this study. Firstly, the 
number of instruments used reflects Peffley and Rohrschneider’s notion (2003) of multiple 
access points “to resolve conflicts”. As pointed out above DDMs can help resolve conflicts by 
putting the contested issues to a popular vote (Alber 2012, 80; Peffley and Rohrschneider !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 It is assumed that if effects took place that these effects took place before or right up to the beginning of the survey. Peffley and 
Rohrschneider have shown that the learning of politically tolerant attitudes needs time (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). This period seems 
an appropriate time to develop such attitudes. One acknowledges that some countries have and have used DDMs much longer. Yet, selecting 
this particular period has the advantage that all countries have used DDMs for at least the entire period and the collected data might not be 
too much influenced by the impact of the Second World War.  
21 
The aggregate variable is called VDD and added up to 5=less direct to 20=more direct. 
22 
Each of the instruments has equal weight. 
23 
Fiorino and Ricciuti (2007) used a seven-point index to measure Direct Democracy. However, their index does not properly reflect the 
frequency of use of DDMs and the diversity of the issues.  
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2003, 246). They serve as alternative channels that directly involve the citizens in the conflict 
resolution. Thus, where the number of such instruments is greater the potential to resolve 
conflicts is assumed to become greater resulting in a greater likelihood to adopt politically 
tolerant attitudes. 
 
Secondly, where votes take place more frequently exposure to democratic norms is believed 
to be greater. Having to go to the ballots more often on multiple issues might to some extent 
reflect Sullivan et al.’s (1993) political arena and might therefore have a similar effect on the 
willingness to extend civil liberties to one’s least-liked group. In addition, through a greater 
diversity of issues to vote on people are more likely to be confronted with values different 
from their own, which as pointed out above, may lead to the learning of more tolerant 
attitudes. Finally, where DDM outcomes are legally binding, people most certainly think 
more carefully about the issue at hand (weighting pros and cons) not only before casting their 
vote at the ballots but also when forming an attitude in general. Table 2 shows the aggregate 
index of Direct Democracy per country including its individual components. As illustrated, 
Finland has the lowest score on Direct Democracy (scoring lowest in all measured aspects) 
and Switzerland the highest with the highest number of binding DDMs, most ballot proposals 
and the highest issue diversity among the countries at study. 
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Table 2 Index Direct Democracy per Country 
 
 
Control Variables 
To control for country specific differences, federalism, party-pluralism and population density 
were also taken into account in this research project. Firstly, federalism24 has been shown to 
have a possible positive effect on Political Tolerance (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). 
Secondly, party pluralism25 might also account for some of the variance. Dutch and Gibson 
(1992) found a greater willingness to allow fascists civil liberties where radical voting enjoys 
some popular support. While not directly controlling for radical voting, but in line with their 
reasoning of more political ideas present at system-level, the number of effective parties in 
parliament might positively affect Political Tolerance. Finally, where population density is 
higher, exposure to system level issues is expected to be greater due to the circumstance that 
it is more difficult to evade issues being discussed within the population.  
 
The source for federalism is the polity III data set (1= Unitary, 2= Intermediate, 3= Federal) 
(Gleditsch 2012). The data for party-pluralism (ENPP) originates in Lijphart’s study on party 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 „Unitary” denotes that “regional units have little or no independent decision making” and “Federalism” is understood as considerable 
decision- making power of most or all regions of a state (Gurr et al. 1990, 83). 
25 Measured by the number of effective parties in parliament (Lijphart 1994, 160-162). 
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systems (1994) and was coded into 1=one party to 5=five parties (Lijphart 1994, 160-162). 
The CIA World Factbook was the source for the final variable, population density (Central 
Intelligence Agency 2012). Population density was calculated by dividing the size of the 
country through the size of the population and then coded into 1=low-, 2=medium- and 
3=high density. 
 
Analysis Techniques 
In order to get a general overview of tolerant attitudes across countries a crosstabs descriptive 
analysis was conducted. Then the main hypothesis was tested. Since the dependent variable 
Political Tolerance had a natural order (ranging from 0 to 3), yet the numbers had no 
quantitative interpretation, an Ordered Probit regression was used by regressing the index of 
Direct Democracy (VDD) on the aggregate index of Political Tolerance (Model 1). In a 
further step (Model 2) the individual components of the VDD index were regressed onto the 
Political Tolerance index (also using Ordered Probit). Unfortunately running the Ordered 
Probit analysis the output could not produce the proportional odds ratios. One could therefore 
only make an assessment of a relationship between the variables but could not determine the 
individual per unit impact on the dependent variable. In order to test the relationship between 
Direct Democracy and the individual aspects of Political Tolerance (office, teach, 
demonstrate) as well as the relationship between the individual aspects of Direct Democracy 
and the willingness to allow the least-liked group to hold office, to teach and to demonstrate, a 
binary logistic regression model was used. In contrast to a multiple regression model, the 
advantage of this model is that it allows one to predict categorical outcome variables, the 
characteristic of the outcome variables “office”, “teach” and “demonstrate” (all coded 0, 1).  
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Results 
Table 3 shows the per country percentage of respondents who expressed the willingness to 
allow members of their least-liked group to hold public office, to teach and to demonstrate. 
It shows a general low frequency of tolerant attitudes, with Switzerland appearing to be least 
tolerant (1,1%) and New Zealand the most tolerant (8,4%) among the countries at study. In 
addition across all countries there seems to be a tendency to be more generous towards letting 
one’s least-liked group demonstrate while it is lowest towards “teach” in Australia, Finland, 
Switzerland and New Zealand. 
 
Table 3  
Tolerance towards Least-Liked Group per Country 
 Office Teach Demonstrate None One Two All 
Australia 12,1% 9,7% 27,8% 68,6% 18,4% 7,9% 5,1% 
Sweden 9,2% 10,2% 29,4% 66,3% 23,1% 6,3% 4,4% 
Finland 9,5% 7,3% 21,7% 74,9% 15,6% 5,5% 3,9% 
Switzerland 3,9% 2,6% 5,4% 92,4% 4,5% 2,0% 1,1% 
New Zealand 13,5% 11,0% 28,5% 69,2% 17,0% 5,3% 8,4% 
Total 10,0% 8,3% 23,1% 73,7% 15,9% 5,8% 4,6% 
 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the Ordered Probit analysis. The expectation was to find higher 
levels of Political Tolerance in more direct democracies (VDD). Unfortunately, when 
controlling for other system-level variables this hypothesis could not be confirmed. Model 1 
shows an insignificant negative relationship between Direct Democracy and the aggregate 
Political Tolerance values across countries. Conversely, all control variables appear to make a 
significant and negative contribution to Political Tolerance. Thus, the likelihood to adopt 
norms of tolerance appears to be smaller in countries that have a federal state structure, 
multiple effective parties in parliament and a higher population density.  
 
However, regressing the individual variables of Direct Democracy on Political Tolerance 
(Model 2), the diversity of the issues voted on as well as the number of DDMs appear to 
become significantly negatively related and the frequency of use of DDMs and their legal 
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bindingness seem to become positively related to Political Tolerance. Thus, where citizens 
live in systems with more DDMs and with the possibility to vote on issues of greater 
diversity, they appear to be less likely to allow the basic liberties of holding office, teaching 
and demonstrating to their least-liked groups. Conversely where citizens live in systems 
where DDMs are frequently used and where outcomes are binding on the government the 
likelihood to adopt tolerant norms increases. This again offers some support for the 
hypothesis by showing that certain aspects of Direct Democracy, namely where having the 
option to vote more frequently and where outcomes are binding people tend to adopt more 
tolerant attitudes. 
 
Table 4 Political Tolerance Index  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Estimates (SE) Estimates (SE) 
VDD -,01  
(,02) 
 
DDM  -1,12** 
(,08) 
Frequency of use DDM  ,67** 
(,07)** 
Issue Diversity  -,47** 
 (-,47) 
Legal Bindingness  ,46** 
(,04) 
Federalism -,14** 
(,01) 
0a 
ENPP (Parties) -,11** 
(,04) 
0a 
Population Density -,25*  
(,1) 
0a 
N 5668 5668 
!2 285,71** 285,71** 
Ordered Probit: p < .05*, p < .01**, a. Dropped because of Multicollinearity 
 
Tables 5 to 9 show the results of the binary logistic regression analysis. While controlling for 
other system-level variables, when people live in countries where democracy is more direct 
(VDD) they are more likely to allow their least-liked group to hold public office but no more 
likely to allow the liberties to teach at their schools and to demonstrate (table 5). On the 
contrary, while not being significant, this relationship is slightly negative indicating that in 
more direct democracies it appears to be more difficult to allow these rights to disliked 
groups. These findings therefore only partially confirm the original hypothesis. People living 
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in more direct democratic systems appear to be only more willing to extend to their disliked 
groups the right to hold public office. Chi-square is significant with all three outcomes 
variables, indicating that the model explains a significant amount of additional variance in 
“office”, “teach” and “demonstrate” compared to when these variables were not included. 
 
Table 5 VDD index   
 Office Teach Demonstrate 
 " (SE) " (SE) " (SE) 
Constant -,65** 
(,23) 
-,50 
(,27) 
1,34** 
(,19) 
VDD ,06* 
(,03) 
-,01 
(,03) 
-,04 
(,02) 
Federalism -,49** 
(,13) 
-,26 
(,14) 
-,28** 
(,1) 
ENPP (Parties) ,082 
(,11) 
-,20 
(,11) 
-,24** 
(,07) 
Population Density -,93** 
(,26) 
-,36 
(,27) 
-,49** 
(,18) 
N 5668 5668 5668 
Model !2 76.00** 78,34**  300,71** 
Logit: p < .05*, p < .01**  
 
Table 6 shows the effect of the number of Direct Democracy Mechanisms (DDM) on the 
scores of the willingness to allow the least-liked group to hold office, to teach at one’s school 
and to demonstrate. All else equal, in countries with more Direct Democracy provisions 
people appear to be significantly more likely to allow their least-liked group to hold office 
while this effect appears to be insignificant and slightly negative with “teach” and 
“demonstrate”. However, as with the previous model Chi-Square remains significant. 
 
Table 6 DDM   
 Office Teach Demonstrate 
 " (SE) " (SE) " (SE) 
Constant -,70  
(,23) 
-,49 
(,27) 
1,36** 
(,19) 
DDM ,23*  
(,10) 
-,05 
(,10) 
-,12  
(,07) 
Federalism -,38** 
(,09) 
-,28** 
(,10) 
-,34** 
(,07) 
ENPP (Parties) ,02  
(,08) 
-,19* 
(,09) 
-,20** 
(,06) 
Population Density -,86** 
(,23) 
-,37 
(,24) 
-,53** 
(,16) 
N 5668 5668 5668 
Model !2 76,00** 78,34** 300,71** 
Logit: p < .05*, p < .01**  
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Tables 7 and 8 show similar patterns. People are significantly more likely to extend the liberty 
to hold office to their most objectionable group when living in systems where people vote 
more frequently (table 7) and where outcomes are legally binding (table 8). This partially 
confirms the hypothesis. The likelihood to allow people to teach and to demonstrate in such 
countries remains negative and insignificant. Chi-Square appears to again be significant for 
all three outcome-variables. 
 
Table 7 Frequency of use DDM   
 Office Teach Demonstrate 
 " (SE) " (SE) " (SE) 
Constant -,59* 
(,23) 
-,52 
(,27) 
1,30**  
(,19) 
Frequency of use 
DDM 
,30* 
(,14) 
-,07 
(,14) 
-,16  
(,09) 
Federalism -,49** 
(,14) 
-,26 
(,14) 
-,28** 
(,10) 
ENPP (Parties) ,17 
(,14) 
-,22 
(,15) 
-,28**  
(,10) 
Population Density -1,16** 
(,36) 
-,31 
(,37) 
-,36  
(,24) 
N 5668 5668 5668 
Model !2 76,00** 78,34** 300,71** 
Logit: p < .05*, p < .01**  
 
 
 
Table 8 Legal Bindingness   
 Office Teach Demonstrate 
 " (SE) " (SE) " (SE) 
Constant -,66** 
(,23) 
-,50  
(,27) 
1,34** 
(,19) 
Legal Bindingness ,15* 
(,07) 
-,03  
(,07) 
-,08 
(,05) 
Federalism -,42** 
(,10) 
-,27* 
(,11) 
-,32** 
(,08) 
ENPP (Parties) ,02 
(,08) 
-,19* 
(,09) 
-,20** 
(,06) 
Population Density -,71** 
(,18) 
-,39* 
(,22) 
-,57** 
(,14) 
N 5668 5668 5668 
Model !2 76.00** 78,4** 300,71** 
Logit: p < .05*, p < .01**  
 
 
Table 9 shows the effect of the issue diversity on the willingness to allow the disliked group 
to hold office, to teach and to demonstrate. When controlling for other system-level variables 
the effect on “office” appears to have assumed a significant negative value, which indicates 
that people living in countries in which issues brought to a popular vote are more diverse are 
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less likely to extend the respective freedom to their least-liked group. To some extent this 
finding fails to confirm the original hypothesis. Political Tolerance, in this case measured by 
the willingness to allow the least-liked group to hold office, is less likely in countries where 
people have to vote on a greater diversity of issues. The findings also fail to confirm the 
hypothesis in the aspects of the willingness to allow the rights to teach and to demonstrate. 
The relationship between issue diversity and the respective freedoms is insignificant and 
negative. 
 
Table 9 Issue Diversity   
 Office Teach Demonstrate 
 " (SE) " (SE) " (SE) 
Constant ,59* 
(,23) 
-,52 
(,27) 
1,30** 
(,19) 
Issue Diversity -,90* 
(,42) 
-,20 
(,42) 
-,48 
(,28) 
Federalism 1,39* 
(,54) 
-,06 
(,55) 
,20 
(,37) 
ENPP (Parties) -,47 
(,28) 
-,29 
(,28) 
-,44* 
(,19) 
Population Density 1,76** 
(,63) 
-,17 
(,63) 
-,04 
(,42) 
N 5668 5668 5668 
Model !2 76,00** 78,34** 300,71** 
Logit: p < .05*, p < .01**  
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Thus, how does the directness of democracy influence Political Tolerance? At the onset a 
single hypothesis was defined, namely that a greater directness of democracy should be 
conducive to the learning of politically more tolerant attitudes. More precisely, independent of 
other system level variables, in more direct democracies greater levels of Political Tolerance 
were expected.  
 
Testing the main hypothesis the initial expectations to find higher levels of Political 
Tolerance in more direct democracies could unfortunately not be supported. Citizens living in 
such systems appeared to be as unwilling to extend to their least-liked groups the rights to 
hold public office, to teach at their schools and to demonstrate, as citizens living in less direct 
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democracies. This suggests that in more direct systems Political Tolerance is as hard to learn 
as in less direct systems. However, when engaging in a more detailed analysis of the different 
components of Direct Democracy one discovered that the effects of Direct Democracy on 
tolerant attitudes appeared to be much more complex. In other words the different 
components appeared to contribute differently to the adoption of more tolerant attitudes. In 
the countries at study where people had to decide on issues more frequently and these 
decisions were binding on the government, the willingness to extend civil liberties to disliked 
groups appears to be more likely. Conversely, in systems with multiple available Direct 
Democracy Mechanisms (DDM), tolerance levels appeared to be lower. The same applied to 
countries where ballot propositions were more diverse. This indicates that in such systems 
citizens appear to “unlearn” the willingness to extend to objectionable groups the right to hold 
office, to teach and to demonstrate.  
 
Why should there be such a difference in effect? First considering the aspect of having to 
decide on issues more frequently, Sullivan et al. (1993) assume that the frequent direct 
exposure to democratic norms leads to a greater likelihood to adopt tolerant attitudes due to a 
constant priming effect. This could be one explanation (Sullivan et al. 1993, 53, 72). 
However, having the possibility to frequently decide on issues might also give citizens a sense 
of control over what is decided at system-level. Thus, when extending liberal rights to least-
liked groups the expected damage caused by the respective groups could, if necessary, be 
corrected by a popular vote. If these votes are legally binding (the second positive 
relationship) this sense of control might even become stronger.  
 
The negative relationship between the number of instruments as well as issue diversity with 
Political Tolerance is more puzzling. Due to the construction of the variable the countries that 
have more direct democratic provisions also have the right to initiate law or propose an 
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amendment to the constitution (New Zealand, Switzerland). Hence, in countries where people 
are allowed to raise their own issues, allowing the liberties at discussion to the least-liked 
groups might give these groups undue influence over what issues are raised and which issues 
are adopted. In countries that provide citizens with the possibility to decide on a variety of 
issues it might be seen as rather negative to allow objectionable groups to hold office, to teach 
and to demonstrate because these ideas have the chance to affect a greater number of aspects 
of public policy.  
 
An investigation into the different aspects of Political Tolerance, showed that in more Direct 
Democracies people were only significantly more likely to extend “the right to hold public 
office” to their most objectionable groups, while they were no more likely to extend the other 
liberties to those groups. More specifically, in countries with more Direct Democratic 
Mechanisms, where votes took place more frequently and where the outcomes of these votes 
were legally binding, people had more positive attitudes towards the holding of public office. 
Note that the previous findings, that a system’s number of DDMs leads to lower tolerance 
levels, when only measuring the likelihood in such systems to extend to least-liked groups the 
right to hold public office, the relationship had become positive. This is possibly due to the 
slightly negative values of “teach” and “demonstrate” that might have influenced the initially 
more positive attitudes toward the allowing of least-liked groups to hold office. It could also 
be the control variables (that had previously dropped out due to multicollinearity) explaining 
away some of the negative influence of the number of instruments. Whatever the reasons, the 
findings suggest that the greater number of access points to accommodate conflicting interests 
provided by multiple DDMs, the greater exposure to democratic norms and control over 
decisions by voting more often as well as the security offered by the legal bindingness of such 
instruments might indeed have had a certain learning effect in the respective countries. In 
such systems citizens might have learned that they could correct possible mishaps caused by 
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their least-liked groups in office and might have therefore been more likely to allow this 
activity to their most objectionable group. 
 
One relationship that had remained negative appeared to be the greater diversity of issues. In 
the countries where people not only had to vote on their country’s accession to an 
international organization, but where they were asked to cast their vote on human rights 
issues, economy, public service and other issues, in these systems people did appear to be less 
likely to extend the right to hold public office to their disliked groups. Why might that be? 
Maybe in such countries, if people were confronted with a greater diversity of political ideas - 
which is believed to be more likely in systems where people are voting on multiple issues –
with this experience over an extended period of time, they tended to become more cautious of 
extending the right to hold public office to their disliked groups. The respective groups may 
have been expected to abuse their power positions to rally support for their own set of 
interests affecting with their behavior a greater variety of issues. According to Altman (2011), 
Plebiscites for example can be abused by power holders and can have potentially harmful 
effects when supported by extensive campaigning. The same could apply to citizens’ 
initiatives when particular party interests favor a specific outcome (Altman 2011, 53, 86).  
 
Why was no apparent significant relationship found between Direct Democracy and allowing 
disliked groups the teaching at the respondents’ schools as well as allowing the respective 
groups to demonstrate? One explanation could be that the control variables federalism, the 
number of effective parties in parliament and the population density had already explained a 
great deal of variance in the respective civil liberties across countries. However, these 
variables only appeared to be strong predictors for demonstrations by the respective groups. 
An explanation for the insignificance of allowing the teaching at one’s school could therefore 
be confounding individual-level variables. In more direct democracies, with people having 
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young children or being in a child-rearing age the fear that the ideas of objectionable groups 
might unduly influence the opinion of future political participants might be much stronger 
than with people without children or already grown-up children. An alternative explanation 
could be that while people might not have direct control over what is taught at their schools, 
the teachers’ influence on the political system26 through the greater directness of democracy, 
might have been seen as of an indirect, more marginal nature. Their tolerant attitudes might 
have therefore been influenced by other much more important attributes not considered in this 
study. One could make a similar argument for allowing demonstration by objectionable 
groups. Gibson and Bingham (1982) have found that individuals were much more likely to 
adopt less tolerant attitudes if they expected violence occurring from a certain activity. This 
kind of threat is of a different nature than threat to the system as a whole. However, these are 
only hypothetical explanations. 
 
The results show that a future inquiry into the effects of Direct Democracy on Political 
Tolerance must also take into account individual level differences such as threat perception 
and age. Another limit closely related to this notion is that with this data one could not control 
whether people in theses countries actually casted their votes at the ballots. Furthermore, the 
individual variables for the Direct Democracy index were built subjectively in relation to the 
data collected from the countries at study and in relation to country-level differences to one 
another. Future studies, including more countries might have to use a more refined index 
including all possible instruments and ordering them more precisely according to their actual 
impact they might have on tolerant attitudes. In addition, instead of using categories it might 
have been more useful to actually include the numerical values of the number of votes, the 
diversity of ballot propositions and the legal bindingness of ballot outcomes. Finally, due to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Gibson (2006) argued that if a group is believed to pose a threat to the wider community or the system as a whole, people tend to adopt 
less tolerant attitudes (Gibson 2006, 25). !
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the research focusing on system-level variations only, regional Direct Democracy 
Mechanisms could not be taken into account. As a result West Germany and the United States 
having DDMs at sub-state level but not at system level could not be considered in this 
research project. Future research might indeed take these along while simultaneously 
controlling for regional-level differences in Direct Democracy. Despite these limits this 
research project might have revealed some important aspects contributing both to the Political 
Tolerance literature as well as the literature on Direct Democracy.  First of all it showed, that 
Direct Democracy as an institution might to some extent influence aggregate Political 
Tolerance levels, at least in the countries at study. Furthermore it may have revealed some of 
the complexity of the two main concepts Direct Democracy and Political Tolerance. In other 
words irrespective of other system-level variables, certain aspects of Direct Democracy 
appeared to contribute differently to the individual aspects of Political Tolerance. When 
extending the right to hold public office, given the issues are not too diverse, being able to 
circumvent the legislature more often and more decisively appears to be something positive. 
In such systems citizens might indeed learn more tolerant attitudes by having a greater 
likelihood of being exposed to democratic norms, by having alternative channels to resolve 
conflict and by having the option to exercise a certain control over what is decided at system-
level. The circumstance that Direct Democracy did not have a significant impact on the 
aggregate tolerance levels towards teaching and demonstrating showed that in order to get a 
more in-depth understanding of this relationship, individual-level variables such as age and 
threat perception will have to be taken into account in future studies. 
 
Appendix 1 
Least-Liked Group and Political Tolerance Questions 
“I'd like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and 
political order in this society.  
Would you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like 
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least?” (World Value Survey Organization 2012b) 
 
1. Jews* 
 2. Capitalists  
3. Stalinists/hard-line Communists*  
4. Immigrants  
5. Homosexuals  
6. Criminals  
7. Neo-Nazis/Right extremists*  
*(Functional equivalent used for these items) 
 
 
“Do you think that (identified least-liked group) should be 
allowed to” (World Value Survey Organization 2012b) (Yes/No/ DK): 
 
Hold public office?  
Teach in our schools?  
Hold public demonstrations?27 
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Codebook 
V2_2 (Country) 
1 = "Australia"  
2 = "Sweden"  
3 = "Finland"  
4 = "Switzerland"  
5 = "New Zealand" 
V167 (Least Liked Group) 
1  = "Jews"  
2  = "Capitalists"  
3  = "Stalinist/Hard line Communists"  
4  = "Immigrants"  
5  = "Homosexuals"  
6  = "Criminals"  
7  = "Neo-Nazis/Right Extremists"  
8  = "Members of New Religious Movements"  
9  = "Radical Maori Activists"  
10 = "Christian Fundamentalist"  
11 = "Non-Christian Fundamentalist"  
12 = "Racists"  
 
V168_3 (Least Liked Group allow: hold office) 
0 = "No"  
1 = "Yes" 
 
 
V169_3 (Least Liked Group allow: teach) 
0 = "No"  
1 = "Yes" 
 
V170_3 (Least Liked Group allow: Demonstrate) 
0 = "No"  
1 = "Yes" 
 
VTOL (Aggregate Index Tolerance: Office, Teach, Demonstrate) 
0 = "Allows none"  
1 = "Allows one" 
2 = "Allows two" 
3 = "Allows all" 
 
VIns (Number of DDMs National Level) 
1 = "No" 
2 = "1 (Plebiscite)"  
3 = "2 (Plebiscite, Constitutional Referendum)" 
4 = "3 (Plebiscite, Constitutional Referendum, Initiative)"  
5 = "4 (Constitutional Referendum, Facultative Referendum, Initiative, Counter-Proposal)"  
 
(Finland, Sweden= 2, Australia= 3, New Zealand= 4, Switzerland= 5) 
 
! $#!
Vnum (Number of Votes 1945-1995) 
1 = "Low (1)" 
2 = "(12)"  
3 = "(28)" 
4 = "(56)"  
5 = "High (,&')"  
 
(Finland= 1, Sweden= 2, Australia= 3, New Zealand= 4, Switzerland= 5) 
Vbin (Legal Bindingness of DDMs) 
1 = "Never"  
2 = "1%-29%" 
3 = "30%-59%" 
4 = "60%-99%"  
5 = "Always"  
(Finland, Sweden= 1, Australia, New Zealand= 4, Switzerland= 5) 
Vdiv (Issue Diversity 1945-1995) 
1 = "No (0)" 
2 = "(4)"  
3 = "(6)"  
4 = "(12)"  
5 = "High (> 12)" 
 
(Finland= 1, Sweden= 2, New Zealand= 3, Australia= 4, Switzerland= 5) 
 
VDD (Aggregate Index Direct Democracy: DD instruments, Frequency of Use, Diversity of 
Issues, Legal Bindingness of DD Decisions) 
5 = "Less" 
7 
14 
15 
20 = "More" 
 
VFed (Federalism) 
1 = „Unitary“ 
2 = „Intermediate“ 
3 = „Federal“ 
 
(Finland, Sweden, New Zealand = 1, Australia, Switzerland= 3) 
 
VParty (Number of Effective Parties in Parliament) 
1 = "One" 
2 = "2"  
3 = "3"  
4 = "4"  
5 = "Five"  
 
! $$!
(New Zealand, Australia= 2, Sweden= 3, Finland, Switzerland= 5) 
 
 
VPopdens (Population Density, Country Size/Population) 
1 = "low" 
2 =  "Medium" 
3 = "High" 
 
(Australia= 1, Finland, Sweden, New Zealand= 2, Switzerland= 3) 
 
